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ABSTRACT 
The VIKING Scientific Satellite launched 
piggyback on Ariane in February 1986 
collected magnetospheric data for 444 days. 
The project was highly successful and of low 
cost. The key to low cost and high perform-
ance lies in a careful formulation of 
mission requirements. Costly increases often 
come from secondary or derived requirements, 
i.e. requirements which optimize performance 
or scientific return. To squeeze out a few 
more per cent of science data may perhaps 
double the cost. The paper describes exam-
ples of how such cost traps were avoided in 
the VIKING project. 
KAILSTAR is a low-orbit store-and-forward 
satellite communications system conceived by 
the Swedish Space Corporation. phase B 
studies have just been completed and show 
that it is possible to provide a high relia-
bility public telecommunications service by 
using small satellites. The satellite con-
cept is described as well as different 
launching concepts, including a piggyback 
arrangement on the Chinese Long March 2 
rocket. 
Sweden's first satellite, VIKING, was launched on February 
22, 1986 as a piggyback payload on the Ariane 1 rocket that 
orbited the French remote sensing satellite SPOT. The 
satellite conducted a very successful magnetospheric re-
search mission until May 12, 1987. The VIKING project was 
managed by the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) under con-
tract from the Swedish Board for Space Activities, the 
government space agency. sse is a government-owned organi-
zation responsible for the execution of Sweden's space 
program. The satellite was developed by SAAB Space with 
Boeing Aerospace as a major subcontractor. 
The project aimed at gathering new insights into the forma-
tion of Aurora Bore~lis by making a complete set of plasma 
physics measurements in the magnetosphere at an altitude of 
2 earth radii and on magnetic field lines connected to the 
auroral oval. Fig. 1 summarizes the key features of the 
project and Fig. 2 shows the configuration of the satel-
lite. 
Fig. 1 Summary of the VIKING Project 
THE VIKING SATELLITE PROJECT 
SUI1rIARY 
1,,"'rutl ... I: 1986-1911 
0 •• 1 .... ..... 
L...cII: f ...... ery 22.1986 rr_It ....... Arl_ 
V 16 ..... u..r .llIa u.. SPOT I ..... IU ... 
ftess: un-.rr lanS 5211 t,. *y .. ns 2IS6 t, 
60 t, sci4lllC. INIyl ... 
laltl.1 OrIIlt: 81 +-13530 t ... 98.8 .. IIICU .. U ... 261.2 
.. i. ""I'" 
Sy ...... Lir.: Desi .. IIr.-24O .y •• t 80 ........ ility 
Ach.1 IIr .......... Bys. Opwllll ... c .... , 
n.y 12.1987. SI .. I ............. sy.~. 
Size: 0.: ....... 1 'Ist 0.5 ......... i". 1.9 ... ler i • 
• 1 ......... . 
P_ ... : 80 Wett _I ... arrey 1M ..... I 14 Welt 1M. 
1M.'" ftl ... 12 All NI-C. ut ..... y. 
AttlhM: ................... It .....-uc ......... I ... r u.. 3 r,.. 
c..-t .... 1 Sltl. vee ...... n .......... ter-c __ 
hiM Sltl. cell r.,. Sltl. r .... c .. wl. 
T.I_try: 2.5 Wetts Rf 1M."''' 2208.163 rtHz .t 54.6 tltps 
(49.6 t ... er sc14lllC ..... , 
Tel.c._ ... : S-II ... upll_ .. 2033.5 rtHz 
Trllctl .. a. C.trl: ESRAJI8E. Itlr ... S ..... (67.89 N. 21.1 IE) 
0rII1 ... 1 ,.,. .... tars ........ 1 ... r~ r-.I .. 
.. t.. 
Sc14lllC. INIyl ... : VI Electric fie" E.,...I ••• Rey.1 I.stlh .... r Tec ... I.,y. 
Stack .. I •• S ..... 
V2 n .... uc Fl ... EII,...I .... t. JeIIn .... 1 ..... Iv .• USA 
V3 E ...... tlc P..-Ucl. E ..... I_t. I_Uh .... r stNIc. 
PIIyslc •• Itl ...... S ..... 
V4 W..,. E.,...I_t • .",...Ie I ........ rlc OHwve ..... y. 
S ........ u.. o-lsII Space Rueercll I •• tlhta 
V5 1. ....... 1 I ...... E.,...I_t. "'lverslty .rc.lgary. 
C ..... . 
TIle ..... IIIt. cerrl'" r ... 40 ........ I ... r"'lel .Ire ..... . 
.... t •• 4 ........ I ..... I ........ n... ............. te411 
VI ... V4.1 .... ltI .. u..re • .,.. t ....... t .urr r .. I.1 
..... r.,. u.. V2'" V4 ......... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Sweden's first own venture into space had high scientific 
ambitions in the field of geocosmosphysics, traditionally a 
very strong area of space science in Sweden. The project 
also had the purpose of building a technology base in 
Sweden for carrying out the design and operation of space 
systems. These ambitious goals had to be carried out within 
a very tight fiscal envelope. 
Such constraints made it necessary to make some rather 
difficult technical and scientific trade-offs. It is the 
story about these trade-offs and how they eventually led to 
a very successful mission that the first part of the paper 
intends to convey . 
Defining the Scientific Mission 
When a small nation sets out to make its first scientific 
satellite it is important to choose the scientific object-
ive carefully. If one chooses an objective which requires 
the satellite to make a long-duration mapping of certain 
phenomena one arrives at completely different technical 
trade-offs than with an "exploratory" objective. An "explo-
ratory" mission, in which one wishes to make a concentrated 
assault on some specific scientific problems, does not 
require a satellite which lasts for many years. It becomes 
possible to trade platform reliability and complexity 
against scientific payload. 
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Fig. 2 The VIKING satellite 
The scientists did indeed choose an "exploratory" objective 
for VIKING and even adopted a "campaign" mode of operating 
the science instruments. During periods of a few weeks all 
the investigators gathered at the ground station and ran a 
continuous scientific seminar. The satellite was used to 
test the theories that were put forward in the seminar room 
next to the Operations Center. Such a mission philosophy 
permitted some rather interesting technical trade-offs. 
Adapting to the-Launch Opportunity 
During the first studies of the VIKING project in 1978 we 
looked for an orbit that would give maximum access to the 
altitude region 10,000-15,000 km. The first orbit we 
studied would have an apogee at about 15,000 km and a 
perigee at whatever altitude that a piggyback launch oppor-
tunity would provide. It was clear from the beginning that 
we could not afford our own launch vehicle. We had to ride 
piggyback ,into space. The inclination that we felt was most 
useful was 63-65 degrees, which would permit the apogee to 
be fixed over the northern hemisphere, thereby permitting 
all the science data gathering to take place within view of 
our ground station at Kiruna in the northern part of 
Sweden. 
This inclination was studied because we were considering 
using a Soviet launch vehicle at that time. Many soviet 
launches use such inclinations. 
So, this kind of orbit seemed ideal. Therefore considerable 
scepticism was felt by the project team when the use of a 
piggyback launch opportunity on the planned launch of SPOT 
by an Ariane rocket was introduced. 
The SPOT/Ariane launch would put VIKING into an i=98.7 deg 
circular orbit at 822 km altitude. By firing an on-board 
motor the required 15,000 km apogee would be achieved. 
However, for this orbit the argument of perigee would not 
be fixed. In fact, it takes two years for the apseline to 
rotate once around the earth (Fig. 3). This at first seemed 
quite unsuitable for our mission. 
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Fig. 3 Rotation of the Apseline of the VIKING Orbit 
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However, orbit iimulations showed that the motion of the 
apseline offered an opportunity to scan over different 
regions of the magnetosphere and magnetic latitude. We 
found that the orbit would permit the study of the interes-
ting regions of the northern polar magnetosphere for about 
8 months before the apogee had drifted too far south. 
Since the mission was designed to be exploratory, i.e. most 
scientific questions would "receive an answer" within a few 
months after launch it was decided to adopt 8 months as the 
design lifetime of the satellite. We assigned a rather 
arbitrary number of 80% as the analytical probability for 
satellite survival during these 8 months. 
A piggyback launch usually severely limits the satellite 
mass and/or volume. This was also the case for VIKING, 
especially in terms of satellite height. The volume avail-
able to us between the Ariane third stage payload adapter 
and the SPOT satellite was only 0.5 meters high but about 2 
meters in diameter (Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4 The VIKING/SPOT Piggyback Arrangement 
This naturally put a limitation on solar array area, which 
more or less dictated the power budget of the satellite. We 
had adopted a design rule of having only bodyfixed solar 
panels. Mission analysis showed that the whole science 
payload could operate for 80 minutes on every orbit. 180 
minutes could be achieved on some orbits if idle orbits 
were inserted before and after such a long-duration data 
taking. 
The bottom line of the mass budget of the satellite was 
rather easy to determine. The Ariane 1 had 550 kg of spare 
capability for the SPOT 1 launch. To get VIKING's apogee up 
to 15,000 km, and assuming a gross weight of 500 kg, about 
230 kg of solid rocket propellant is needed. Thus the dry 
weight of the satellite had to be roughly 270 kg. (Actually 
it was 286 kg and the required propellant mass fits very 
well with the STAR 26 C motor in the Thiokol rocket motor 
catalogue! ) 
One could then rather quickly estimate the mass of the 
structure and essential subsystems and hence arrive at the 
science payload mass. The mass of the science payload could 
be traded off against redundancy in the basic subsystems of 
the satellite. If one did not wish to trade science payload 
against redundancy the only remaining alternative was to 
reduce apogee, and thereby compromising the scientific 
objectives. 
Well, the apogee requirement was reduced slightly (it was 
required to exceed 13,000 km), but the crucial decision was 
made to fly the mission with a "single-thread" system, i.e. 
no redundancy in the satellite. This decision was possible 
because we had adopted an 8 month lifetime and analysis 
showed that a single-thread system would meet the 80% 
reliability requirement. 
However, reliability calculations do not make the system 
engineering manager sleep well at night. Only a quality 
conscious team of manufacturers does. SAAB and Boeing 
were such a team. 
Supressing "Nice-To-Have" Requirements 
So, the Ariane piggyback opportunity had led to trade-offs 
meaning an 8 month design life, a single-thread system and 
80 minutes of data-taking per orbit. 
,This was a good start towards achieving a low-cost high-
yield mission. However, what now remained was to combat the 
tendency to optimize every aspect of the system. This is 
what the engineer is trained to do. But in this tendency 
lurks the danger of cost increases which may threaten the 
project (if it gets too expensive it may be cancelled). 
The tendency to make an optimum mission and system design I 
sometimes call the "secondary requirements trap". Second-
ary, "derived" or "nice-to-have" requirements are like the 
octopus' arms in Fig. 5. You have to chop them off as soon 
as they appear through the door, otherwise they will catch 
you! Let me give you some examples from the VIKING project! 
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Fig. 5 The System Engineering Manager Fighting 
"Nice-to-have" Requirements 
Defining the "Mission Target". The region of maximum scien-
tificinterest (or "mission target") was defined as the 
altitude range 8,000-15,000 km, 60-80 degrees invariant 
latitude, local time at the field line footprint=18-24, 
season=October1-April1 (see Fig. 6). The orbital para-
meters of the VIKING orbit should be optimized to maximize 
the time spent in this four-dimensional box. The boundary 
condition was naturally the 98.7 deg, 822 km initial orbit 
with the ascending node at 2230 local time and a launch 
date at any time of the yearr 
The four-dimensional box could be reduced to constraints 
for two orbital parameters. One of these was a requirement 
for defining the initial argument of perigee so that the 
apogee would culminate over the north pole during the time 
oct-March. The other requirement derived from the four-
dimensional box was to control the local time of the 
ascending node. In fig. 7 the field-line footprint 
requirement has been converted into ascending node time. 
• Local tilDe of field-line foot-
print: 1800-2400 hours 
• Season: October 1 - March 31 
Fig. 6 Four-dimensional "Mission Target" 
Line A describes the orbit provided by Ariane and the 
mission could start at any point on this line. The line B 
shows the motion of the local time of the node in the 
operational orbit of VIKING (822-15,000 km i=98.7). How to 
maximize the length of B falling within the "Mission 
Target" marked in fig. 7? 
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Fig. 7 VIKING "Mission Target" Expressed in a 
Date vs. Node Orientation Diagram 
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well-trained and enthusiastic satellite controllers with a 
mandate to take action when needed are indeed an insurance 
against premature mission failure! 
The "Resource Envelope" Concept - An Example. There was no 
spare VIKING satellite, only a protoflight model, and no 
immediate follow-up mission planned. So, why not play it 
safe and put in as much radiation shielding as possible to 
make the instruments function as long as possible? Well, 
that may seem like the clever thing to do, but we adopted a 
different philosophy. System Engineering decided that there 
could be no general rule, the scientists had to decide 
among themselves and sometimes each instrument designer 
made his own choice. 
For example, some instruments would yield significant 
results after having been in operation only for a few days 
or weeks while other instruments needed a longer time to 
"reap the harvest". of course the whole complement of 
instruments worked together and should work as a system for 
a certain minimum time. 
As it turned out each instrument designer chose his own 
way. One designer put in minimum shielding and used the 
extra mass to have more functional features while another 
played it safer and put in 5 mm of Al as a shield. 
Thus, the allocation of shielding mass between experiments 
was never something that System Engineering worried about. 
This was all handled within the group of investigators. 
System Engineering had given the scientists a "resource 
envelope" within which they could make their own trade-
offs. 
The resource envelope contained a total mass, power and 
data rate for the overall science payload. No margin was 
given for this envelope. It was an absolute, never-to-be-
trespassed boundary! This principle generated a lot of 
ingenuity in the design and operation of the science pay-
load and contributed to the very efficient mission and it 
gave a stability to the system design work which contri-
buted to the low cost. 
Of course, if you set up such an absolute "envelope" you 
cannot cheat - System Engineering has to be quite open 
about the fact that there are margins, but explain that he 
keeps the margins in his own pocket to hand out to sub-
systems and payload if really serious problems turn up. 
This kind of "local self-government" requires mutual trust 
between scientists and system designers - absolutely! 
Where We Did Not Compromise 
My description of the trade-offs made in the system desian 
of VIKING may have given the impression that we always h d 
to yield to fiscal pressures and compromise mission safety 
and scientific return at every technical decision point. 
This was definitely not so. We took some calculated risks, 
I admit, but the really mission-essential requirements were 
adhered to strictly. For example the satellite was extreme-
ly electrostatically clean. We had conductive cover glass 
on solar cells and conductive thermal control paint and 
thermal blankets. We even put a slightly conducting 
"radome" on the log-spiral radio antennas in order to 
ascertain that the satellite body made good electrical 
contact with the space plasma. In this way the satellite 
would cause the minimum disturbance to the plasma environ-
ment. 
Another scientific requirement that was strictly enforced 
was that of maintaining a high data rate. This was absolut-
ely essential to transmit wave spectra, auroral images and 
other data streams. We used as much RF output power as 
possible without upsetting the DC power budget. When that 
did not suffice we introduced convolutional encoding (only 
used by deep space probes at that time) and a viterbi 
decoder on the ground. This modification cost nothing in 
the satellite but maybe a hundred thousand dollars in 
ground equipment. This bought us a 5.6 dB better link and 
fulfilled a mission-essential requirement! 
The risk of not having redundancy had to be compensated 
for. Therefore equipment and subsystems qualified and 
flight proven in other programs were used to the maximum 
extent. In addition the prime contractor SAAB Space en-
forced very strict quality assurance procedure for critical 
subsystems such as the S-band transponder and other parts 
of the TT&C system. 
Finally, I wish to show a visible example of VIKING's 
"scientific harvest", A UV image of the auroral oval 
(Fig. 9). VIKING was able to produce such an image every 20 
seconds, a vast improvement over earlier satellites. 
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The obvious answer is to let VIKING stay in the low 822 km 
orbit until one has reached the region R. Then the motor 
would be fired and the mission would proceed along a line C 
with the same slope as B. The point along the orbit where 
the motor would fire controls the argument of perigee and 
by using this strategy full control over the orientation of 
the orbit would be achieved for an arbitrary launch date. 
The drawbacks with this strategy are that you have to keep 
the rocket motor in storage in space for a long time and 
the risk of mission loss is increased. You cannot rollout 
booms and remove sensor covers before motor ignition and 
therefore there would be a long period of no scientific 
data. Also, it would be necessary to have stored-command 
capability and deployed antenna booms which could withstand 
the high-g rocket impulse. In addition, the thermal control 
system would have had to be designed for two cases, the 
spin vector in the orbital plane and perpendicular to the 
orbital plane. The simple thermal concept with a "cold" and 
a "hot" side of the satellite would not have been possible. 
This scheme was never adopted for one very simple reason -
the risk of loosing the mission while waiting for motor 
ignition during months was not worth taking. It was better 
to get some data quickly even if the orbit orientation was 
not optimum. So, we decided to fire the motor on the third 
orbit by timer control and there would be no communication 
with the satellite from lift-off until after the motor had 
fired and antenna booms could be safely deployed. (Thus, 
the mission proceeded along line B in Fig. 7.) We also 
deleted the requirement for stored commands. with the 
apogee over the north pole we had plenty of contact time on 
every orbit and only real-time control was used. 
The decision to fire the motor immediately was essentially 
made by the scientists. I concocted the optimized strategy 
and presented it to the scientists to see how die-hard the 
requirements for an optimum orbit was! I got my answer. We 
then used only a varying argument of perigee to maximize 
the time within the four-dimensional box. Another boundary 
condition was added to the mission design; but a very wise 
and cost-saving condition! Another octupus' arm chopped 
off! 
Protecting the Power System. The thing we feared most in 
the operation of the satellite was to destroy the battery. 
Solar panel power was only half of the peak load with all 
experiments turned on. Protecting the battery became a real 
obsession with the Flight Operations crew. Since we only 
had one ground station, losing contact with the satellite 
while there was full power load on the bus would be 
dangerous. 
Such an unfortunate situation could appear either as a 
result of an operator error; forgetting to switch off the 
payload and transmitter before LOS, or because of a failure 
in the command up link transmitter. 
Therefore the satellite had an amp-hour meter which 
monitored the state-of-charge (SOC) of the battery and 
switched off non-essential loads in case the SOC dropped 
too low. Therefore we did not need to invest in a redundant 
uplink transmitter on hot standby. This saved a not insig-
nificant sum in the project. 
This all sounded safe, but as the mission proceeded the 
amp-hour meter could not be used as intended and we were 
left with no automatic protection against discharging the 
batteryl And, as stated by Murphy's Law, we had a failure 
in the 1 kW uplink transmitter! 
The uplink transmitter power suddenly started dropping 
during a middle-of-the-night pass when the satellite was 
operating at maximum power drain. Within a few minutes the 
transmitter power had dropped to zero. What saved the 
mission? Certainly not any automatic device - we had none 
left to rely upon! No, it was the satellite ground control-
ler who, all alone in the dead of the night, took all the 
right decisions in a matter of seconds before losing all 
uplink power. She switched off all non-essential loads 
before contact was lost and saved the mission. 
Fig. 8 The VIKING Operations Center 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
Fig. 9 Aurora over Greenland on March 25, 1986. Image 
taken from 8090 km altitude at 2047 UT. 
Image: VIKING and the University of Calgary 
MAILSTAR 
Since 1984 the Swedish Space Corporation has been studying 
a commercial low-orbit store-and-forward communications 
system based on the use of small satellites. The market for 
the system is Swedish industry and trading companies opera-
ting in the Third World. These studies have been supported 
by the Swedish Board for Space Activities and a company 
established to commercialize the concept, the Mailstar Co. 
The Mailstar Company is owned by the Swedish Telecommuni-
cations Administration, SAAB Space, Ericsson Radio and the 
Swedish Space Corporation. Phase B has been completed. 
Network Principle 
The system is based on a network structure as in Fig. 10. A 
base station handles all traffic between users. A remote 
terminal drops a message in the satellite "Mailbox". The 
base station reads the memory on each passage over the base 
station and relay messages to destinations in Sweden via 
the terrestrial -network. Messages to other remote terminals 
and messages from Sweden to remote terminals are uploaded 
to the "Mailbox" computer memory. The base station also 
uplink a "polling list" which the satellite uses to control 
traffic with remote terminals. Thus the satellite exercises 
system control. 
MAl LST AR NETWORK STRUCTURE 
Fig. 10 .. MAILSTAR Network Principle 
The use of a high-latitude base station is very advantage-
ous for serving the whole world from a polar orbit. As seen 
in Fig. 11, 70% of all orbits in one day pass within "view" 
of a base station assumed to be placed at Kiruna Sweden. 
Two kinds of remote terminals have been studied, a 64 kbps 
model with a 0.7 meter steerable dish and a 2 kbps model 
with a fixed omni antenna. The remote terminal is built 
around a personal computer. 
Traffic Capacity 
Traffic simulations show that with two satellites in orbit, 
each having a 64 kbps link and an 80 Mbit memory 200-300 
Mbyte can be transferred in and out of Sweden per day. This 
assumes that there are 130 remote terminals transmitting 
short messages. Of these terminals 40% are assumed to be 
located in each of Latin America and Asia while 10% are 
located in each of Africa and Oceania. 
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Fig. 11 MAILSTAR Contact Times. One Satellite in a 
h=822 km, i=98.7 deg Orbit. 
The average delay between transmission and reception of a 
message is around 2.5 hours while 95% of all messages have 
reached their destinations within 7 hours. 
The high data rate has been determined to be able to handle 
areas of high user density where up to 75 terminals may be 
within view of the satellite. 
Satellite Design 
The characteristics of the space segment are summarized in 
Fig. 12, and the configuration and size is shown in Fig.13. 
The Mailstar project has been conceived as a purely commer 
cial enterprise. Thus, high capacity, low cost and high 
reliability have been design drivers. These considerations 
led to a coherent set of trade-offs. Some of the trade-offs 
related to the satellite design and their influence on 
ground terminal design are "walked through" below. 
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Piggyback Again. It was clear from the feasibility study 
phase that the space segment would dominate overall costs. 
Therefore we tried very hard to make the satellites as 
small and cheap to launch as possible. We aimed at small 
satellites that could be launched piggyback. To find 
regularly available launch opportunities is essential to 
run a commercial space system. At the moment this is not 
easy for any commercial space system operator. To find 
regularly occuring piggyback launches is even harder! 
Therefore the satellite has been designed to fit several 
launch vehicles. The basic launch vehicle adapter ring of 
the satellite is compatible with SCOUT. Using SCOUT is not 
a piggyback launch, but if there are no piggyback launches 
available one may be forced to buy a dedicated launch. 
Right now, the cheapest dedicated launcher is the SCOUT. 
To fit the Ariane and CZ-2 launch vehicles special adapters 
have been designed. For Ariane a 1194 mm diameter tube 
structure like the VIKING central tube houses the satellite 
during launch. The main satellite, a SPOT or other remote 
sensing satellite is placed on top of this tube. After 
separating the main satellite the tube with Mailstar is 
separated from the third stage and the Mailstar satellite 
is then ejected from the tube. 
Otameter 2.2 meter 
Long Mllrch 2 rocket 
Fig 14. CZ-2 Piggyback Arrangement 
For the CZ-2 a "propulsive adapter" called the Orbital 
Transfer r'lodule has been designed (Fig. 14). This is in 
essence a conical adapter structure with rocket motors for 
giving a two impulse Hohmann transfer from the initial 175-
400 km orbit to a h=l200 km circular orbit. 
Satellite Size and the Allocation of System Gain. It is 
reasonably safe to assume that the smaller the satellite 
is, the lower are the launch costs. However, the smaller 
the satellite, the smaller the solar panel area is avail-
able. Lack of solar panel area limits the DC power avail 
able and essentially sets an upper limit for the RF output 
power of the downlink transmitter serving the customers. 
Market studies show that up to 64 kbps data rate is needed 
to serve the customers. with satellite output power, anten-
na gain (essentially an antenna with hemispheric coverage) 
and data rate more or less fixed the gain of the ground 
user terminal could easily be determined. For the L-band 
frequencies chosen, it turned out that a dish with about 
0.75 meter diameter is needed to achieve the system gain 
necessary to support 64 kbps. Thus, satellite size dictates 
ground antenna diameter. 
However, the satellite moves across the sky, so this anten-
na has to be steerable. A monopulse tracking system is 
costly even in mass production, so the design of the remote 
user terminal is based on knowledge of the satellite orbit. 
The terminal receives orbital data from the satellite. This 
data is transmitted as part of protocol headers. The termi-
nal calculates azimuth and elevation and sends commands to 
step-motors driving the antenna dish. 
Thus, the antenna is steered by "dead reckoning". Studies 
show that orbital parameters need only be updated every 
fortnight. A total pointing error of the remote terminal 
antenna of 5-7 degrees has been allocated in the link 
budget. The orbit computation error contribution to this 
total error has been set at 2 degrees. Remaining errors are 
mainly alignment errors in setting up the antenna azimuth 
turntable. 
On-Board Redundancy. The space segment costs increase with 
redundancy, but so does system life. Studies showed that it 
was highly cost-effective to have each satellite fully 
redundant, i.e. all subsystems except the mass memory for 
message storage have been assumed to be redundant. So, in 
constrast to VIKING which completely lacked on-board 
redundancy, this small satellite project ended up with a 
fully redundant system deSign. 
Project Status 
The system has been fully cos ted and independent market 
surveys have been made. Competitive tariffs have been set 
and a normal business analysis has been made to determine 
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return-on investment, financial risk exposure and other 
viability indicators. The analysis shows that the system 
can earn a handsome profit as a purely commercial system 
without subsidies of any sort. However, similar services 
can be provided through geostationary satellites promising 
a higher profit and lower risk exposure for the system 
operator. 
However, a significant part of the prospective customers 
prefer an independent and self-contained communications 
system like Mailstar over a geostationary system requiring 
several hops for global traffic. The inherent resistance to 
jamming and eavesdropping of the Mailstar system is also an 
attractive feature. Therefore the system is being re-evalu-
ated to serve such "closed user groups". 
Some technical concept changes may be necessary and it is 
probable that the system must share the space segment with 
other missions. Hopefully, by the time this conference 
convenes again we shall be able to report on the new 
definition of the system. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent experience in operating and designing small 
satellites in Sweden has demonstrated that such vehicles 
are highly useful for sophisticated science missions and 
that they also are commercially profitable in the field of 
store-and-forward communications. 
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